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I n a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme 
Court held in Caterpillar, Inc. v. 
Lewis, 117 S. Ct. 467 (1996), that 
a district court's error in failing to 
remand an improperly removed 
case was not fatal to the 
adjudication when jurisdiction was 
proper at the time of judgment. 
The Court so held despite its 
finding that the plaintiff did not 
waive his objection to removal by 
failing to seek an immediate 
appeal of the district court's denial 
of his motion to remand. In 
reversing the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
the Court extended its prior 
holdings to instances where the 
plaintiff has moved timely, yet 
unsuccessfully, to remand a case 
for improper removal. 
On June 22, 1989, James 
David Lewis ("Lewis") filed a 
products liability suit in a 
Kentucky state court after sus-
taining injuries while operating a 
bulldozer at work. Lewis, a citizen 
of Kentucky, asserted state law 
claims against both the bulldozer's 
manufacturer, Caterpillar, Inc. 
("Caterpillar"), a Delaware cor-
poration, and Whayne Supply 
Company ("Whayne"), the 
Kentucky corporation that serviced 
the bulldozer. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Group ("Liberty 
Mutual"), a Massachusetts cor-
poration and Lewis' employer's 
insurance carrier, intervened as 
plaintiff by asserting subrogation 
claims against Caterpillar and 
Whayne for workers' compensa-
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tion paid to Lewis by his em-
ployer. 
Within a year of initiating the 
suit, Lewis settled his claims with 
Whayne. On June 21, 1990, 
Caterpillar filed a notice of 
removal in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern 
District of Kentucky, claiming that 
complete diversity among the 
parties had been reached as a result 
of Lewis , settlement with Whayne. 
After the removal was granted, 
Lewis objected to the removal and 
moved to remand the case back to 
state court, urging that Liberty 
Mutual's remaining action against 
Whayne prevented completed 
diversity jurisdiction. His motion, 
however, was rejected by the 
district court, which erroneously 
held that diversity was complete. 
In 1993, prior to trial, Liberty 
Mutual and Whayne reached a 
settlement. Whayne was dis-
missed as a party to the suit, 
thereby completing diversity be-
tween the parties prior to the 
district court's subsequent judg-
ment for Caterpillar. Following 
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the district court's denial of Lewis' 
motion for a new trial, Lewis 
appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit. Finding that 
complete diversity did not exist at 
the time of removal, the court of 
appeals vacated the district court's 
judgment and Caterpillar appealed 
to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
In beginning its analysis, the 
Court first stated two "givens": (1) 
the district court had erred in 
denying Lewis' motion to remand; 
and (2) the court of appeals was 
correct in concluding that com-
plete diversity did not exist at the 
time of removal. Caterpillar Inc. 
v. Lewis, 117 S. Ct. at 473. 
The Court then analyzed 
Caterpillar's assertion that vaca-
tion of judgment would be im-
proper in light of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in American Fire 
& Gas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 
(1951), and Grubbs v. General 
Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 
699 (1972). Caterpillar at 473-74. 
In Finn, the Court held that 
vacation of judgment is proper 
when federal jurisdiction is lacking 
at the time judgment is entered. 
Caterpillar at 473-74 (citing Finn, 
341 U.S. at 17-18). The Court 
subsequently limited the ability of 
plaintiffs to appeal removals in 
Grubbs when it held "the validity 
of the removal procedure followed, 
may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal." Caterpillar at 474-75 
(quoting Grubbs, 405 U.S. at 700). 
In response to Caterpillar's argu-
ments, the Court countered that 
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their prior decisions in Finn and 
Grubbs did not resolve the issue in 
Caterpillar, namely, whether a 
plaintiff may appeal a judgment 
when the district court has erron-
eously denied a removal. Id. at 
474. 
Furthermore, the Court found 
that Lewis had preserved his 
objection to removal since the 
denial of a motion to remand is not 
final and is therefore not im-
mediately appealable as of right. 
Id. at 475. Thus, Lewis' failure to 
pursue an interlocutory appeal did 
not waive his right to appeal. Id. 
The Court reasoned that if failure 
to pursue interlocutory appeals 
waived diversity jurisdiction 
objections, the purpose of pro-
viding interlocutory review for 
"exceptional" cases would be 
destroyed by routine requests for 
review. Id. 
The Court next considered 
Lewis' argument that, having 
timely preserved his objection, 
"[the] ultimate satisfaction of the 
subject-matter jurisdiction 
requirement ought not swallow up 
antecedent statutory violations," 
because such a course would 
prejudice plaintiffs who timely, 
but unsuccessfully, mo've to re-
mand. Id. at 475-76. In addition, 
Lewis claimed Caterpillar 
circumvented the procedural 
limitations of28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), 
because they avoided the one-year 
limitation to file for removal by 
removing before subject-matter 
jurisdiction existed. Id. at 476. 
The Supreme Court, however, 
wholly rejected Lewis' arguments 
in favor of policy considerations of 
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"finality, efficiency, and economy. 
... " Id. The Court relied, in part, 
on its decision in Newman-Green, 
Inc. v. AlJonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 
826 (1989), in which it posited 
that, "requiring dismissal after 
years of litigation would impose 
unnecessary and wasteful burdens. 
... " Caterpillar at 476 (quoting 
Newman-Green at 836). The 
Court maintained that economical 
adjudication outweighed the need 
to vacate an improperly removed 
case in which subject-matter 
jurisdiction was ultimately satis-
fied. Id. The Court emphasized, 
however, that judgments may still 
be vacated in cases lacking 
subject-matter jurisdiction at the 
time of judgment. Id. at 477. 
In addition, the Court also 
disagreed with Lewis' remaining 
arguments, stating that it did not 
believe its ruling would encourage 
wrongful or premature removals 
by defendants desiring to either 
bypass the one-year removal 
requirement or gamble on future 
events to create proper subject-
matter jurisdiction. Id. at 477. 
The Court reasoned that it was 
unlikely that defendants would 
take a chance on the jurisdictional 
defect escaping detection and 
subsequently being cured prior to 
judgment. !d. Such an attempt 
would result in a quick remand and 
raise the ire of the court. Id. 
The United States Supreme 
Court in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis 
held that despite an erroneous 
refusal to remand, the resolution of 
a jurisdictional subject-matter 
defect before judgment will 
prevent a vacated judgment upon 
appeal. Caterpillar is an example 
of the Court's unanimous pro-
motion of judicial economy over 
procedural rights. Unfortunately, 
under Caterpillar, plaintiffs denied 
their requests for remand will have 
to immediately appeal the decision 
in order to preserve their forum 
choice. Thus, the interlocutory 
appeal the Court said should be 
used for "exceptional" cases, will 
have to be utilized for plaintiffs 
who want to preserve their forum 
choice in light of a refusal to 
remand. Whether the Court has 
drawn a line in the sand, protecting 
the vestiges of subject-matter 
jurisdiction by asserting that 
complete diversity must exist at 
judgment remains to be seen. 
Based on the trend of judicial 
economy, one is unsure when the 
newly established line will move 
yet again. 
